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Abstract. Modular programming enjoys many well-known advantages
but the composition of modular units may also lead to inefficient pro-
grams. In this paper, we propose an invasive composition method which
strives to reconcile modularity and efficiency. Our technique, network
fusion, automatically merges networks of interacting components into
equivalent sequential programs. We provide the user with an expres-
sive language to specify scheduling constraints which can be taken into
account during network fusion. Fusion allows to replace internal commu-
nications by assignments and alleviates most time overhead. We present
our approach in a generic and unified framework based on labeled tran-
sition systems, static analysis and transformation techniques.
1 Introduction
Modular programming enjoys many well-known advantages: readability, main-
tainability, separate development and compilation. However, the composition of
modular units (components) gives rise to efficiency issues. Sequential compo-
sition poses space problems: the producer delivers its complete output before
the consumer starts. Parallel composition relies on threads, synchronization and
context switches which introduce time overhead.
In this paper, we propose an invasive composition method, network fusion,
which strives to reconcile modularity and efficiency. Our technique automati-
cally merges networks of interacting components into equivalent sequential pro-
grams. Our approach takes two source inputs: a network of components and
user-defined scheduling constraints. Networks are formalized as Kahn Process
Networks (Kpns) [7] a simple formal model expressive enough to specify compo-
nent programming and assembly. Scheduling constraints allow the user to choose
the scheduling strategy by specifying a set of desired executions. The operational
semantics of Kpns and scheduling constraints are both formalized as guarded
labeled transition systems (Lts).
?
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Network fusion is an automatic process which takes a Kpn and scheduling
constraints and yields a sequential program respecting the constraints. Note
that constraints may introduce artificial deadlocks, in which case the user will
be warned. The resulting program must be functionally equivalent to the Kpn
modulo the possible deadlocks introduced by constraints. Fusion alleviates most
time overhead by allowing the suppression of context switches, the replacement
of internal communications by assignments to local variables and optimizations
of the resulting sequential code using standard compiling techniques. Network
fusion can be seen as a generalization of filter fusion [12] to general networks
using ideas from aspect-oriented programming [8] (scheduling constraints can be
seen as an aspect and their enforcement as weaving).
The four main steps of the fusion process are represented in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Main steps of network fusion
– The first step is the abstraction of the network into a finite model called
an Abstract Execution Graph (Aeg). An Aeg over-approximates the set of
possible executions traces. We do not present this step in details since it
relies on very standard analysis techniques (e.g., abstract interpretation)
and many different abstractions are possible depending on the desired level
of precision. Instead, we focus on the properties that an Aeg must satisfy.
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– The second step consists in enforcing constraints. This is expressed as a
synchronized product between guarded Lts (the Aeg and the constraints).
In general, this step does not sequentialize completely the execution and
leaves scheduling choices.
– The third step completes the scheduling of the constrained Aeg. Several
strategies can be used as long as they are fair. Again, these strategies can
be expressed as guarded Lts and scheduling as a synchronized product.
– The fourth step, concretization, maps the scheduled (serialized) Aeg to a
single sequential program. Further transformations (e.g., standard optimiza-
tions) can then be carried out on the resulting program.
We have chosen to present fusion in an intuitive and mostly informal way. In
particular, we do not provide any correctness proofs. They would require a com-
plete description of the operational semantics of Kpn too long to fit space limits.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the syntax and semantics of
Kpns. Section 3 describes Aegs and defines the abstraction and concretization
steps which both relate Aeg to concrete models (programs and Kpns). Section
4 presents the language of constraints and the two main transformation steps of
fusion: constraints enforcement and scheduling. We propose three extensions of
the basic technique in Section 5 and, finally, we review related work and conclude
in Section 6.
2 Networks
We start by providing the syntax of components and networks. We just out-
line their semantics and provide some intuition using an example. A complete
structural operational semantics for Kpns can be found in [6].
2.1 Basic Components
Components are made of commands c of the form:
l1 : g | a ; l2
where l1 and l2 denote labels, g a guard and a an action. An action is either a
read operation on an input channel f?x, a write operation on an output channel
f !x, or an internal action i (left unspecified). A component (or process) p is a
set of commands {c1, . . . , cn}. If the current program point of a component p is
l1, if l1 : g | a ; l2 is a command of p and the guard g is true, then the action a
can be executed and the program point becomes l2.
The components we consider in this paper represent valid, sequential and
deterministic programs. They have the following restrictions:
– A component has a unique entry point denoted by the label l0.
– All the labels used in p are defined in the lhs of commands.
– Two commands with the same label have mutually exclusive guards.
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Components
P =
{
p0 : x := x + 1 ; p1;
p1 : f !x ; p0
}
C =


c0 : a < b | f?a ; c1;
c0 : a ≥ b | ι?b ; c1;
c1 : o!(a + b) ; c0


Network
ι
	
P
f  
 C
o
	
Semantics
Assuming inputs:
ι 7→ 1 : . . .
(p0, c0)
x 7→ 0
a 7→ 0
b 7→ 0
f 7→ 
x:=x+1







a≥b|ι?b








(p1, c0)
x 7→ 1
a 7→ 0
b 7→ 0
f 7→ 
f !x






a≥b|ι?b








(p0, c1)
x 7→ 0
a 7→ 0
b 7→ 1
f 7→ 
x:=x+1







o!(a+b)








(p0, c0)
x 7→ 1
a 7→ 0
b 7→ 0
f 7→ 1 : 
	
(p1, c1)
x 7→ 1
a 7→ 0
b 7→ 1
f 7→ 
	
(p0, c0)
x 7→ 0
a 7→ 0
b 7→ 1
f 7→ 
	
Fig. 2. A Simple Kpn and its trace semantics
The program P in Figure 2 sends the set N in increasing order on channel f .
Program C assigns a with the value read on channel f if a < b or assigns b with
the value read on the channel ι otherwise. Then, it sends a + b on the channel o
and loops. Note that guards are omitted when they are true.
The semantics of a component p is expressed as a Lts (Σp, (l0, s0), Ep,−→p)
where:
– Σp is an (infinite) set of states (l, s) where l a label and s a store mapping
variables to their values.
– (l0, s0) is the initial state made of the initial label l0 and store s0. We as-
sume that the initial label is always indexed by 0 and that the initial store
initializes integer variables by the value 0,
– Ep is the set of commands of p,
– −→p is the transition relation (actually, a function) on states labeled with
the current command.
The initial labels of programs P and C (Figure 2) are p0 and c0 respectively
and the variables x, a and b are initialized to 0. In the remaining, we use c|g and
c|a to denote the guard and the action of the command c respectively. To simplify
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the presentation, we consider only non-terminating programs. Termination could
always be represented by a final looping command such as lend : skip ; lend .
2.2 Networks of Components
A Kpn k is made of a set of processes {p1, . . . , pn} executed concurrently. Net-
works are build by connecting output channels to input channels of components.
Such channels are called internal channels whereas the remaining (unconnected)
channels are the input and output channels of the network. The communication
on internal channels is asynchronous (non blocking writes, blocking reads) and is
modeled using unbounded fifos. In order to guarantee a deterministic behavior,
Kpns require the following conditions [7]:
– An internal channel is written by and read from exactly one process.
– An input channel is read from exactly one component (and written by none).
– An output channel is written by exactly one component (and read from
none).
– A component cannot test the absence of values on channels.
In order to simplify technical developments, we assume that networks have a
single input and output channels denoted by ι and o respectively and that the
input channel never remains empty.
The global execution state of a Kpn is called a configuration. It is made
of the local state of each component and the internal channel states i.e., finite
sequences of values v1 : . . . : vn : .
The operational semantics of Kpn is expressed as a Lts (Σk, α0, Ek,−→k) where:
– Σk is a (infinite) set of configurations,
– the initial configuration α0 is such that each component is in its initial state
and each internal channel is empty,
– Ek is the union of the sets of commands of components; these sets are sup-
posed disjoint,
– the transition relation −→k is defined as performing (non deterministically)
any enabled command of any process. A command is enabled when the cur-
rent program point is its lhs label, its guard is true in the current configura-
tion/state and it is not a blocking read (i.e., a read on an empty channel).
The transition relation gives rise to an infinite graph representing all the
possible execution traces. A small part of the transition relation −→p for our
example is depicted in Figure 2. Here, no global deadlock is possible and all
traces are infinite.
An infinite execution trace is said to be fair if any enabled action at any point
in the trace is eventually executed. The denotational semantics of a Kpn is given
by the function from the input values (the input channel) to the output values
(the output channel) generated by fair executions. We will write Traces(k) and
IO(k) to denote the set of traces and the denotational semantics of the Kpn k
respectively. Kpns of deterministic components are deterministic [7]. Also, all
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fair executions with the same input yield the same output [6]. An important
corollary for us is that Kpns are serializable: they can always be implemented
sequentially.
3 Abstract Execution Graphs
Network fusion necessitates to find statically a safe and sequential scheduling.
This step relies upon an abstract execution graph (Aeg), a finite model upper-
approximating all the possible executions of the Kpn. We present in this section
the key properties than an Aeg should satisfy and present an example.
An Aeg k] is a finite Lts (Σk] , α
]
0, Ek] ,−→k]) with:
– Σk] a finite set of abstract configurations,
– α
]
0 is the initial abstract configuration,
– Ek] a (finite) set of commands,
– −→k] a labeled transition relation.
The idea behind abstraction is to summarize in an abstract configuration a
(potentially infinite) set of concrete configurations [10]. This set is given by the
function conc : Σk] → P(Σk) defined as:
conc(α]) = {α | α ≈ α]}
where ≈ is a safety relation relating k and k] (and we write k ≈ k]).
There can be many possible abstractions according to their size and accuracy.
Network fusion is generic w.r.t. abstraction as long as the Aeg respect two key
properties: safety and faithfulness. To be safe, the initial abstract configuration of
an Aeg must safely approximate the initial concrete configuration. Furthermore,
if a configuration α1 is safely approximated by α
]
1 and the network evolves in
the configuration α2, then there exists a transition from α
]
1 to α
]
2 in the Aeg
such that α2 is safely approximated by α
]
2. These two points ensure that any
execution trace of the Kpn is safely simulated by one in the Aeg. Formally:
Definition 1. [Safety] Let k ≈ k], then k] is a safe approximation of k iff
α0 ≈ α
]
0
α1 ≈ α
]
1 ∧ α1
c
−→k α2 ⇒ ∃α
]
2. α2 ≈ α
]
2 ∧ α
]
1
c
−→k] α
]
2
A key property of safe abstractions is that they preserve fairness. Of course,
since they are upper approximations they include false paths (abstract traces
whose concretization is empty). However, for abstract traces representing feasible
concrete traces, fair abstract traces represent fair concrete traces. Safety also
implies that all fair concrete traces are represented by fair abstract traces.
An Aeg is said to be faithful if each abstract transition corresponds to a
concrete transition modulo the non-satisfiability of guards or a blocking read.
In other words, faithfulness confines approximations to values. A false path can
only be an abstract trace with a transition whose concrete image would be a
transition with a false guard or a blocking read. Formally:
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Definition 2. [Faithfulness] Let k ≈ k], then k] is a faithful approximation
of k iff
α
]
1
c
−→k] α
]
2 ∧ α1 ≈ α
]
1 ⇒ ∃α2.α2 ≈ α
]
2 ∧ α1
c
−→k α2
∨ ¬G[[c|g ]]α1
∨ (c|a= f?x ∧ α1[f 7→ ])
Faithfulness rules out, for instance, the (highly imprecise but safe) abstrac-
tion made of a unique abstract state representing all concrete states. In practice,
the same abstract state cannot represent different program points (label config-
urations).
In order to provide some intuition we give here a crude but straightforward
abstraction:
– Each process state is abstracted into the program point it is associated to.
So, variables are not taken into account and process stores are completely
abstracted away,
– Each internal channel state is represented by an interval approximating the
length of its file.
(p0, c0)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
x:=x+1
 

a≥b|ι?b


a<b|f?a


















	
(p1, c0)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
a≥b|ι?b


a<b|f?a


















f !x
	 

(p0, c1)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
o!(a+b)
 
x:=x+1
 
(p1, c1)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
o!(a+b)

f !x
	 

Fig. 3. Example of an Aeg
It is the control flow graph of the Kpn where each node holds a collection of
intervals approximating the lengths of internal channels at the configuration of
program points the node represents. The Aeg for our running example is given
in Figure 3. In this particular example, the state of f is always approximated by
the interval [0, +∞[ (the most imprecise information). More precise Aegs could
be designed (see Section 5.2).
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An Aeg bears enough information to be translated back into a program.
Commands (guards and actions) label edges and nodes represent labels. The
concretization of finite Lts k] = (Σk] , α
]
0, Ek] ,−→k]) into a program is formal-
ized by the following straightforward translation:
Concretization(k]) = {l
α
]
1
: c ; l
α
]
2
| α]1
c
−→k] α
]
2}
An important property of safe and faithful abstractions is that their con-
cretization has the same semantics as the network they approximate.
Property 1. If k] is a safe and faithful approximation of k then Traces(k) =
Traces(Concretization(k]))
4 Fusion
The user can specify scheduling constraints defining a subset of execution traces.
Constraints impose implementation choices; they serve to guide and to optimize
the fusion process. Constraints respect the black box nature of components.
They are expressed w.r.t. IO operations, liveness properties or sizes of files.
When constraints completely sequentialize the execution (no choice remains),
they specify a scheduler. In general, however, constraints are incomplete and
leave implementation choices.
4.1 Scheduling Constraints
We specify constraints by finite state Lts labeled with guarded actions. Of
course, a more user-friendly language for declaring constraints should be stud-
ied but this is not the purpose of this article. The formalism used in Sections
2 and 3 is also well-suited to expressing constraints. We enrich the language of
guards with two additional constructs dedicated to the expression of scheduling
strategies:
gc ::= f 	 k | Bp | g where 	 is any comparison operator
The size of a channel can be compared against an integer. For instance, f < 5 is
true if the file f has less than 5 elements. The guard Bp is true if the process p
is blocked (by a read on an empty channel or by other scheduling constraints).
Constraints are more easily specified using sets of actions. We use the follow-
ing notations:
A ::= ? | [f ]? | [f ]! | ¬A | A1 ∩ A2 | Ap
where
– ? represents any action of the network,
– ? (resp. !) represents any read (resp. write) and f? (resp. f !) any read (resp.
write) on file f ,
– ¬A is the complementary set of A,
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 
	λ0
f ! 


(¬f !)P

 

 
	λ1
f?

(¬f?)C

 
	λ0
f ! 


¬f! ∩ ¬f?

 

 
	λ1
f?

¬f! ∩ ¬f?

The Filter Fusion Strategy (ΛFF ) A Simple Incomplete Strategy (ΛIS )
 
	λ0
f=k−1|f !



(¬f!)P
f < k − 1 | f!

 

 
	λ1
f=1|f?

(¬f?)C
f > 1 | f?

	
 
	λ0
BC |(¬f !)P

BC |f !

(¬f?)C

 
	λ1
f?
 
 
	λ2
f !
ﬀ
(¬f !)P

A Filter Fusion Strategy with Bounds (ΛFB ) A Demand Driven Strategy (ΛDD )
Fig. 4. Examples of Scheduling Constraints
– A1 ∩ A2 is the intersection of the sets A1 and A2,
– Ap represents the projection of the set of actions A onto the commands of
the component p.
For instance, (¬?)p represents all non-read actions of component p. Using sets is
just more convenient; constraints can be automatically translated into a standard
Lts labeled by standard commands afterward.
Figure 4 gathers a few examples of constraints for a network with (at least)
two components P (writing a file f) and C (reading the file f).
– The constraint ΛFF summarizes in a small automaton the strategy used by
Filter Fusion [12]. The producer P starts until it writes on f? The control is
passed to the consumer C until it reads f and so on. This strategy bounds
the size of the fifo f to be at most 1 and therefore it may introduce artificial
deadlocks from some networks. ΛFF sequentializes completely the execution
of P and C (no scheduling choice remains).
– The constraint ΛIS is similar to ΛFF except that both P and C can be
executed between writes and reads on f . ΛIS leaves some scheduling choices.
– The constraint ΛFB is a generalization of ΛFF to a file f with k places (i.e.,
P writes k times before the control is passed to C). This is the formalization
of the extension of filter fusion proposed in [3]
– A demand driven strategy is specified by ΛDD . The consumer C is executed
until it blocks i.e., is about to read the empty channel f . Then, P is executed
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until it produces a value in f . The control is passed to C which immediately
reads f and continues.
These constraints can be applied to any network as long as it has two com-
ponents P and C connected at least with a channel f . Of course, constraints can
be specified for any number of components and channels.
4.2 Enforcing Constraints
Enforcing a constraint Λ = (Σλ, λ0, Eλ,−→λ) to an Abstract Execution Graph
k] = (Σk] , α
]
0, Ek] ,−→k]) can be expressed as a parallel composition (k
] ‖ Λ).
This operation can be defined formally as follows. We assume that all shorthands
(like (¬?)p) used in constraints are replaced by the actions of the Aeg they
represent.
k] ‖ Λ = (Σk] ×Σλ, (α
]
0, λ0), Ek] ,−→kλ)
with
α]
g|a
−→k] α
]′ λ
g′|a
−→λ′
(α], λ)
g∧g′|a
−→kλ (α
]′, λ′)
α]
c
−→k] α
]′ a ∈ Σk]\Σλ
(α], λ)
c
−→kλ (α
]′, λ)
If an action a is taken into account by the constraints, the execution can proceed
only if both Lts can execute a (i.e., they can both execute commands made of
a and a true guard). The actions not taken into account by the constraints
can be executed independently whenever possible. Constraints do not introduce
new actions (Eλ ⊆ Ek). To simplify the presentation, we assumed in the above
inference rules that the guards did not use the condition Bp. We now present
the rule corresponding to this condition in isolation.
The Bp construct serves to pass the control to another component when
one is blocked. The condition Bp is easily defined w.r.t. Kpns: p is blocked in
configuration α if there is no outgoing transition labeled with a command of
p. However, Aegs are approximations with false paths; a component p can be
blocked even if the corresponding abstract state has outgoing transitions labeled
with commands of p. Actually, p is blocked in an abstract state if any outgoing
p transition has either a false guard or is a read on an empty channel (i.e., is not
enabled). Formally, let c1, . . . , cn all the commands of p such that α
] ci−→k] α
]
i
and gi =
{
¬(ci|g) ∨ f = 0 if ci|a= f?x
¬(ci|g) otherwise
then the necessary and sufficient condition for p to be blocked in α] is
bp(α
]) =
∧
i=1,...,n
gi
The product of an Aeg with a transition guarded by Bp is defined as follows:
α]
g|a
−→k] α
]′ λ
Bp|a
−→λ λ
′
(α], λ)
g∧bp(α
])|a
−→kλ (α
]′, λ′)
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Figure 5 represents the product of the Aeg of Figure 3 with ΛFF . The component
P is executed until it produces a value on f then C is executed until it reads
a value on f . Note that if a ≥ b remains always true then P will never be
executed. So, the execution is not fair but it is nevertheless correct and yields
the same output as the network (P is never executed only when its production
is not needed). The strategy does not use guards, so no new test appears in the
constrained Aeg. The result is completely sequentialized.
After the constrained Aeg is produced, the size of files is reestimated using
standard static analysis techniques. We have indicated in Figure 5 the new ap-
proximations for f . They show that the Aeg is now bounded (the size of f is at
most 1).
(λ0, p0, c0)
f 7→ [0, 0]
x:=x+1
	
	
(λ0, p1, c0)
f 7→ [0, 0]
f !x
	
(λ1, p0, c0)
f 7→ [1, 1]
a≥b|ι?b  

a<b|f?a

(λ0, p0, c1)
f 7→ [0, 0]
x:=x+1














(λ1, p0, c1)
f 7→ [1, 1]
o!(a+b)

(λ0, p1, c1)
f 7→ [0, 0]
f !x
	
	
	
	
	
	

 	
	
	
	
	
	
Fig. 5. Fusion with ΛFF
It is easy to check that the Aeg can be translated by Concretization (see
Section. 3) into a sequential program. As already mentioned, one goal of fusion
is to suppress internal communications. For unbounded Aeg, internal reads and
writes are replaced by assignments to lists or fifos. Here, the channel f can be
implemented by a single variable vf and writes f !x and reads f?a by assignments
vf := x and x := vf . These assignments can then be suppressed using standard
optimization techniques [1]. Finally, after a renaming of labels, we get:
PC =


pc0 : x := x + 1 ; pc1;
pc1 : a < b | a := x ; pc2;
pc1 : a ≥ b | ι?b ; pc3;
pc2 : x := x + 1 ; pc3;
pc3 : o!a + b ; pc1;


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We have presented the parallel composition as a fairly standard automata
product. Depending on the size of the Lts, this may cause an unacceptable state
explosion. We present a solution to this problem in Section 5.3.
4.3 Scheduling
In general, constraints enforcement leaves implementation choices which must be
taken to produce a sequential program. The fusion process makes these choices
automatically by scheduling the execution of components. A valid schedule must
be fair (all enabled components must be eventually executed) and sequential (the
scheduled execution must correspond to a sequential program).
We choose here a simple and fair policy: round-robin scheduling. Components
are ordered in a circular queue and the scheduler activates them in turn. Either
the current active component is blocked (by a read or a user defined constraint)
either one of its command is executed. In both cases, the control is passed to
the next component. Figure 6 formalizes round-robin for networks with two
components P and C as a guarded Lts. It would be easy to generalize such a
round-robin Lts for any network with a fixed number of processes.
	
  
 	δ0
¬BP |?P


BP ∧ ¬BC |?C


BC ∧ BP |deadlock



  
 	δ1
¬BC |?C

BC ∧ ¬BP |?P

BC ∧ BP |deadlock

  
 	δ2
Fig. 6. Round-Robin Scheduling
The schedule is fair and ensures a complete serialization of the execution. It
starts by enforcing the execution of one instruction of P , then one instruction of
C and so on. If one of the two processes is blocked at its turn, then an instruction
of the other process is executed instead. When both processes are blocked then
it is a global deadlock denoted by the special instruction deadlock.
Constrained Aegs are composed in parallel with the automaton of Figure
6 to obtain sequential programs. The composition is the same as before except
that the deadlock action does not belong to the set of actions of components.
The product will therefore introduce a new deadlock transition along with a
new state in the Aeg. This new transition, which detects a global deadlock,
will be implemented by printing an error message and terminating the program.
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When such a transition appears in the result of fusion, the user is warned of a
possibility of deadlock.
(δ0, p0, c0)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
x:=x+1
	
	
(δ1, p1, c0)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
o!(a+b) 
(δ1, p1, c0)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
a<b|f !x
	
a≥b|ι?b
 

(δ1, p1, c0)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
f !x
 
(δ1, p0, c0)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
a<b|f?a


a≥b|ι?b

(δ0, p1, c0)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
f !x 
(δ0, p0, c1)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
x:=x+1
 

(δ1, p1, c1)
f 7→ [0, +∞[
o!(a+b)
 
Fig. 7. Sequentialization with Round-Robin
Let us consider the scheduling of the original Aeg of Figure 3. This situation
would arise if the user does not provide any constraint. The Aeg obtained after
product (and simplifications) is given in Figure 7. Simplifications are needed
since the product of transitions guarded by BX produces many dummy transi-
tions (i.e., with false guards).
The process P is never blocked (it never reads), so the execution can start
by x := x + 1. The execution must proceed by C if it is not blocked (¬BC).
There are two cases: either a ≥ b and C is not blocked and its action (ι?b)
can be executed, either a < b and C is blocked by a read of the empty file f .
In the latter case, round-robin scheduling passes the control to P and executes
the action f !x. The transition a < b | f !x corresponds to “if C is blocked then
execute the next P ’s command”. We do not describe any further the product
which proceeds similarly. Contrary to the product with ΛFF , the result is fair but
unbounded: the data produced by P may accumulate in the channel f without
bounds.
The correctness of the scheduling process comes from the fact that the prod-
uct with ∆RR yields a sequential, fair and faithful Aeg. Note that network fusion
is generic w.r.t. the scheduling strategy. More sophisticated policies (e.g., using
several queues, based on static or dynamic priorities, etc.) could be considered
as well. As in Section 4.2, we have presented scheduling as an Lts product;
scheduling could also be implemented by the technique outlined in Section 5.3.
in
ria
-0
00
00
94
5,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 1
5 
De
c 
20
05
4.4 Semantic Issues
User-defined constraints can change the semantics of the Kpn. For example,
a constraint which bounds communication channels would cause an artificial
deadlock into an unbounded Kpn. The user may want to enforce properties even
at the price of deadlocks. We consider that a change of semantics is acceptable
as long as it depends on the user and remains under her or his control. However,
this requires to restrict the class of acceptable constraints. Consider the following
constraint:
	
 
	λ0
b 
 




a





Λ1 Λ2
where a and b are two non-mutually exclusive commands and Λ1 and Λ2 repre-
sents distinct constraints. Since a and b can be executed indifferently, a choice
will be made by scheduling. However, depending on this choice, the constraints
that are enforced afterwards (Λ1 or Λ2) are different. For example, Λ1 may imply
an artificial deadlock in some (non statically determined) cases and Λ2 in some
other cases. In other words, the semantics of the resulting program will depend
on a blind choice made by fusion. This semantic change is not acceptable since
it would be out of the control of the user.
Our solution is to restrict the class of acceptable constraints. Namely, if
a constraint leaves a non deterministic choice such as a or b above then the
constraints must ensure that all processes can still evolve in the same way (an
artificial deadlock in one side implies that we have the same artificial deadlock
on the other side). Each choice a or b correspond to set (language) of acceptable
traces (a.L(Λ1) and b.L(Λ2)). A constraint is acceptable if for each choice, the
projection of the corresponding languages to the commands of any process are
equivalent. For the above example we must enforce that
∀p. a.L(Λ1) ↓ p = b.L(Λ2) ↓ p
With this condition, the choices made by the scheduling step do not have any
semantic impact.
All the constraints of Figure 4 are acceptable. It is obvious for ΛFF , ΛFB ,
ΛDD since they do not leave any non deterministic choice. In ΛIS , the two
transitions labeled by ¬f ! ∩ ¬f? leave the choice between executing P or C.
However, in both states, they lead to the same state (and therefore accept the
same language).
5 Extensions
The preceding sections have presented the main ideas of network fusion. We hint
here at three ways of extending the basic technique: providing more linguistic
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support to the user, working on more precise abstractions, avoiding products
between Lts. These three extensions all aim at getting more efficient fused pro-
grams.
5.1 Linguistic support
Scheduling constraints allow users to control network fusion. Other linguistic
support could be provided to users as well. We focus here on special commands
allowing to alleviate the false path problem. False paths arise when data de-
pending controls are abstracted by non deterministic choices [2]. This standard
approximation makes fusion consider infeasible paths and spurious deadlocks.
Synchronization using data
values
P =


l0 : ι?N ; l1;
l1 : ct!N ; l2;
l2 : i := 0 ; l3;
l3 : i < N | i = i + 1 ; l4;
l3 : i ≥ N | skip ; l0;
l4 : dt!x ; l3


C =


l0 : o!0 ; l1;
l1 : ct?M ; l2;
l2 : j := 0 ; l3;
l3 : j < M | j = j + 1 ; l4;
l3 : j ≥ M | skip ; l0;
l4 : dt?y ; l5;
l5 : o!y ; l3


Synchronisation using linguistic
extensions
P =

l0 : ι?N ; l1;
l1 : ct!N ; l2;
l2 : i := 0 ; l3;
l3 : i < N | i = i + 1 ; l4;
l3 : i ≥ N | wait(dt) ; l0;
l4 : dt!x ; l3


C =

l0 : o!0 ; l1;
l1 : ¬waiting?(dt) | dt?y ; l3;
l1 : waiting?(dt) | proceed(dt) ; l0;
l2 : o!y ; l1


Fig. 8. A false path problem (left) and its solution (right)
The left part of figure 8 shows a simple but characteristic example of the
problem. The process P begins by sending on channel ct the number of items
it will produce on channel dt. Then, P and C respectively writes and reads the
same number of items on dt (M = N). However, this information is lost in the
Aeg which abstracts away values. The fusion process must therefore consider
the case where P produces not enough values and C is blocked and also the case
where P produces unconsumed values and the size of dt cannot be bounded.
This problem can be alleviated using commands making synchronization or
termination explicit. The languages of actions and guards are extended with the
following constructs:
a ::= wait(f) | proceed(f) | . . .
g ::= waiting?(f) | . . .
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– The commands wait(f) and proceed(f) permit to express a rendezvous
between the producer and the consumer of a file f . The producer blocks on
wait(f) until the consumer emits proceed(f).
– The predicate waiting?(f) evaluates to true if the producer is waiting on
wait(f) and all data has been consumed on f . It evaluates to false if there is
some available data. It blocks if there is no available data and the producer
is not waiting.
These instructions are just syntactic sugar and waiting?(f) do not affect
the determinism of Kpns. They could be implemented by writing/reading a
special value on an additional channel. On the other hand, they do provide more
information to the fusion process and permit to avoid false paths.
The right part of Figure 8 shows how to take profit of these instructions
on the previous example. Instead of communicating via ct the number of items
written on dt, P finishes its emission by waiting to C. The consumer reads until it
has consumed all data produced by P ; it then releases P and both processes may
proceed. Such explicit rendezvous can be taken into account by the abstraction
step to avoid the problematic false paths mentioned above.
Others instructions could be considered as well. For example, an instruction
close(f), indicating that a process will not write or read on f anymore, would
also be useful.
5.2 More precise abstractions
In section 2, we presented an abstraction representing the control flow graph of
the Kpn. This abstraction gives a very imprecise approximation for the size of
file f at each state ([0; +∞[). As long as they respect the safety and faithful-
ness properties, many other abstractions could be used. We present here a new
abstraction aimed at finding bounded schedules when they exist. A bounded
schedule ensures that the size of fifo files remain bounded throughout the execu-
tion. In this case, fifo can implemented (after fusion) by local variables (instead
of dynamically allocated data structures). Furthermore, when the precise size of
a channel is known there is no need to test for its emptiness before reading it.
In some contexts, such as embedded systems, it is crucial to find bounded
schedules and lot of work has been devoted to this issue ([11], [5], [13]). In the
context of Petri Nets, Cortadella et al. presented a new criterion which limits the
search state for schedules [5] . They conjectured that if a bounded schedule exists
then it will be found in the delimited search space. We can adapt the criterion to
our context to produce abstractions suited to the discovery of bounded schedule.
The idea is to have precise abstract states associating an integer to each size
(not an interval anymore). The same set of control points (e.g., (p0, c1)) may
appear several times in the Aeg with different sizes of files. The finiteness of the
Aeg is ensured by the irrelevance criterion. A state s2 is said irrelevant if the
Aeg contains another state s1 such that:
– s2 is reachable from s1,
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– all fifo have their size in s2 greater or equal than their size in s1,
– each fifo whose size is greater in s2 than in s1 has a non-zero size in s1.
(p0, c0)
f 7→ [0, 0]
x:=x+1
	
a≥b|ι?b  

	
(p0, c1)
f 7→ [0, 0]
x:=x+1
	
o!(a+b)

(p1, c0)
f 7→ [0, 0]
f !x
	
a≥b|ι?b  

(p1, c1)
f 7→ [0, 0]
f !x
	
o!(a+b)

(p0, c1)
f 7→ [0, 0]
x:=x+1
	
o!(a+b)
 
(p0, c0)
f 7→ [1, 1]
x:=x+1
	
a<b|f?a

a≥b|ι?b  

(p0, c1)
f 7→ [1, 1]
x:=x+1
	
o!(a+b)

Fig. 9. Aeg with irrelevance criterion (excerpt)
The idea behind this criterion is that a irrelevant state cannot enable any
new action (e.g., it does not enable a blocked read). It is no use to continue
unfolding the graph. It can be closed using a state where the size of channels are
approximated by [0; +∞[. A small part of the Aeg obtained using the irrelevance
criterion on our running example is shown on Figure 9. A bounded schedule can
be found in the part shown. This improved precision allows to find bounded
schedules automatically; it also involves larger Aegs.
5.3 Instrumented Product
Two steps of network fusion are described as a synchronized product between
guarded Lts. Obviously, in some cases, this could cause a state explosion and pro-
duce too large programs. A solution to avoid this space problem is to implement
the product by instrumenting the Aeg. The Lts representing the constraints
or the schedule is taken into account by the Aeg by introducing a variable (to
represent the state of the Lts) and new instructions (to represent state transi-
tions).
We have used such a technique in [4] to enforce safety properties (expressed
as finite state automata) on programs. We have shown that the instrumentation
can be made very efficient using simple techniques (specialization, minimization
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and reachability analysis). This instrumented product introduces at worst an
assignment (a state transition) at each if and while command.
This technique is easily extended to guarded Lts. Figure 10 represents the
result of the instrumented product between the Aeg of Figure 3 and ΛFF . It
has the same number of states as the original Aeg. On the other hand, instruc-
tions (l := {0, 1}) and tests (l = {0, 1}) have been inserted to encode the state
transitions of ΛFF . Compared to the Lts of Figure 5 which represents the stan-
dard synchronized product, some states like (λ0, p0, c0) and (λ1, p0, c0) are now
merged into a single state (p0, c0). Transitions from this state must now test
whether underlying Lts ΛFF is in the state λ0 or λ1.
(p0, c0)
f 7→ [0, 1]
l = 0 |
x := x + 1

l = 1 ∧ a ≥ b |
ι?b
 

l = 1 ∧ a < b |
f?a ; l := 0


















	
(p1, c0)
f 7→ [0, 0]
f !x ; l:=1
 
(p0, c1)
f 7→ [0, 1]
l = 1 |
o!(a + b)

l = 0 |
x := x + 1

(p1, c1)
f 7→ [0, 0]
f !x ; l:=1
 
Fig. 10. Instrumented product with ΛFF
On this example, the smaller number of states is certainly not worth the
overhead. In general, however, instrumented product is at most linear in size
whereas synchronized product may entail a quadratic blowup. A small time
overhead is preferable to a space explosion. In any case, the user should be given
the opportunity to specify on which Lts (or on which parts of a Lts) using
standard or instrumented product.
6 Conclusion
The inspiration and motivation for this work came from two main sources:
– Filter fusion [12], a simple algorithm to merge a producer connected by a sin-
gle channel to a consumer. Filter fusion is restricted to very specific networks
(pipelines) and to a fixed strategy. Our work can be seen as a formalization
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of filter fusion using synchronized product and as well as a generalization to
arbitrary networks and user-defined strategies. The application of our tech-
nique on pipelined filters with the constraint ΛFF (Figure 4) is equivalent to
filter fusion. The extension of filter fusion with a more sophisticated schedul-
ing strategy proposed in [3] is formalized in our framework by the scheduling
constraints ΛFB (Figure 4).
– Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) [8] whose goal is to isolate aspects
(e.g., security, synchronization, etc.) that cross-cut the basic functional-
ity of the program. Our scheduling constraints can be seen as a schedul-
ing/synchronization aspect and their enforcement as aspect weaving. As in
[4], we consider aspects specified as temporal formulas on the trace semantics
of programs. In network fusion, aspects express scheduling and synchroniza-
tion choices by filtering unwanted (or selecting desired) execution traces.
This restricted and formal view permits to describe and control precisely
the semantic impact of weaving (usually, a very difficult task in AOP).
Some functional program transformations bear similarities with network fu-
sion. As fusion aims at removing values produced on channels by the composition
of components, Listlessness [15] and deforestation [16] aim at removing the in-
termediate data structures produced by the composition of functions. As filter
fusion, these transformations consider producer-consumer pairs and have a fixed
fusion strategy.
The area of embedded/reactive systems has produced a large body of work on
static scheduling. Lin [9] studies the static scheduling of synchronously commu-
nicating processes. Cortadella et al. [5] and Strehl et al. [13] consider scheduling
of asynchronous process networks. They all use petri nets as their underlying
formalism. Like Parks [11], they focus on bounded scheduling and do not con-
sider user-defined constraints even if some integrate a form of fusion. Strehl et
al. [14] propose a design model that permits the specification of components and
scheduling constraints. They derive a scheduler but do not consider fusion.
We have presented a generic and flexible framework for merging networks
of interacting components. It is based on guarded labeled transition systems,
synchronized product, static analysis and transformation techniques. Fusion can
be applied to a large class of networks (Kpns) and can take into account user-
defined scheduling constraints. The technique can be parameterized by different
abstractions, constraints and scheduling strategies. Still, a lot of work remains
to be done.
The formalization and the correctness proofs should be completed. A proto-
type needs to be implemented in order to validate the approach experimentally.
We expect that large programs can be abstracted into small automata since
fusion focuses on I/O instructions (blocks of internal instructions can be rep-
resented by a single action). Along with the use of instrumented product in
problematic cases, we are confident that efficient and reasonable sized programs
can be produced.
More generally we see network fusion as part of a more general framework
to assemble and fuse components. A first feature of such a framework would
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consist in an architecture description language to specify the assembly (i.e., the
ports and their connections). Another useful feature would be the ability to
specify the synchronization instructions. They do not have to be IO instructions
as supposed previously. By considering some actions of two components as IO
operations on a (conceptual) channel f (i.e., f !x and f?x), it becomes possible
to impose constraints on their interleaving.
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